is that, until logic tells us, we may not know just what are the things which in this odd sense we are said to 'know already.'® In the material that follows I try to illustrate a range of tasks, basic to philosophic analysis, in which formal-logic artifice can be instructive if not crucial. I first provide a bit of background on the course setting from which my illustrations are drawn.
A Course Combining Formal Artifice and Dialectical Method
In my own course in formal logic with applications to philosophic analysis for entering freshmen I have developed a package of eight computer-assisted in struction (CAI) programs in logic and argument analysis to teach first-order logic (with identity) at the level of Kahane's treatment in Logic and Philosophy9 (although I use my own unpublished textbook). The CAI package includes question-and-answer tutorials, drill-and-practice routines, and proof-checking and argument-reconstruction programs that operate both on sets of stored English argument texts and on any argument that the students wish to enter. (Sample computer-based exercises are included in the appendix.) These pro grams facilitate coverage of first-order logic, with caveats, sample applications and a bit of finessing, in roughly half a semester. This leaves a lot of discre tionary time for pursuing broader issues in logical theory or more extended ap plications of the formal apparatus in various tasks and contexts o f philosophic analysis. For an entry-level freshman requirement, the course has been very well received and, by all standard accounts, the computer-based logic has been both popular and effective.10
Instead of employing a set of unconnected philosophic arguments merely as vehicles for logical exercise, I employ the formal analysis and reconstruction of arguments, in conjunction with other philosophic tools and dialectical techniques (see Section 3, below), as a guide to sustained inquiry into systematically related philosophic topics (as it happens, in social philosophy). The formal artifice thus provides a tool and a framework for sorting out posi tions, issues, and strategic options in sustained and systematic inquiry (See sec tion 4, below).
Formal analysis and reconstruction o f positions provides operationally definable heuristic constraints on both the search for unstated premises and the successive reformulation of positions and their underlying principles in the course o f dialectical give-and-take. The reconstruction of arguments in express ly valid form provides clear targets for analysis and attack, and an orderly way of tracking issues as objections to particular premises arise. Manifestly valid arguments, in their initial and successive formulations, become centerpieces for dialectical analysis in assigned papers. Because the primary objects of analysis are philosophic positions and their underlying principles, under dialectical duress, the insistence on deductive validity seems a suitable pedagogical device and regulative ideal. Express attention is also given to the method and pro cedural rationale of dialectical inquiry, as it applies to the defense and critique of both the logical norms in use and normative principles in general.11 Difficulty in formalizing principles or arguments provides occasion for reflection on the subtleties of intuition and language that persist in eluding our formal system. But the demand for manifest validity in argument forces reflec tion amid concerted attempts at greater precision and explicitness in formula tion. I attempt, then, to create a sense of what it is like to pursue systematic dialectical inquiry within strict if idealized constraints of logical order, con sistency, and consequence.
Except for my exclusive focus on philosophic arguments and the imposi tion of the problematic but well-defined constraint of manifest validity (so far as that is attainable within the frame of first-order logic), the game plan or pro tocol of argument analysis is similar to that of such applied texts as Stephen Thomas' Practical Reasoning in Natural Language.12 With the aid of our computer-assist programs the typically daunting apparatus of first-order logic, along with our protocol for argument reconstruction, can be learned in roughly the time it takes other classes to cover Thomas' curriculum. Students get the bonus of learning a fair complement of formal logic while learning the 'infor mal' rudiments of argument analysis. One advantage of having the formal ap paratus at hand is that it makes ill-defined tasks like formulating appropriate missing premises or underlying principles better defined than in the absence of formal constraints (like manifest validity), since it renders the determination of logical consequence testable by tolerably objective criteria rather than by mere intuition.
What follows are some extended illustrations of the possible interplay be tween the formal reconstruction of philosophic positions (with their underlying principles) and dialectical analysis, on an introductory level. The degree to which schematization versus symbolization is used will vary, as will the per tinence of quantificational versus sentential logic. Some of the sketches are ver sions of illustrative material or assignments I have used in the course. Some are somewhat idealized reconstructions of the actual course of class discussions that centered around the guided reconstruction o f an argument. The appendix contains a set of philosophically-oriented analytic exercises typical o f those that the students work on the computer or on their examinations. These sketches are only partially continuous, meant only to illustrate how formal logic might be instructively taught in sustained application to certain crucial tasks of philosophic analysis. I will address this material as I might to my students in order to model how philosophic inquiry might proceed under strict logical con straints. The sample arguments that I use for first introducing students to the rudiments of formal and dialectical analysis are hardly state-of-the-art, but cer tainly not uninteresting for initiating philosophic inquiry. I take it that the pedagogical reasons for this are obvious.
3.

Philosophic Dialectic in the Framework o f Formal Validity
Scientists typically refute empirical hypotheses by citing counter-evidence-ob- There is more to this dialectical game than mere refutation by counter example, since every counter-example is evidence for some alternative or con trary principle(s). Constructive, if critical, inquiry through refutation and reformulation is the larger enterprise. Thus, one function of dialectical analysis in philosophy is to explicate, test, and refine the normative principles that underlie our intuitive judgments and inchoate arguments. The concern here is not unlike that of scientists seeking so-called scientific "laws"; or that of our jurisprudential courts in seeking to interpret and refine principlés for the regulation of society.
The procedure of philosophic dialectic, in rough outline, is: 1) to try to capture in explicit premises the intuitions and tacit prin ciples underlying our unreflective arguments about particular cases; 2) to support these premises and principles with clear paradigm cases, cases that are relevantly similar to the case at issue but where we are especially confident of our judgments and their grounds; 3) to adduce the logical consequence of our principles, testing them against putative counter-examples; 4) to reformulate these principles in order better to articulate and accomodate our intuitions about both the counter-examples and paradigm cases before us.
We repeat this process until, ideally, we have rendered our arguments manifestly valid and provided them with fully explicit philosophic principles, principles that are logically consistent among themselves, that accomodate and articulate our intuitions about all the cases so far before us. Our endeavor here is not unlike that of the scientist who wishes his working hypotheses to be con sistent with his over-all theoretical framework and to fit or explain all the rele vant evidence at hand.
When this dialectical process takes place within the framework of valid deductive argument, revision of our principles will most clearly force revision of either our conclusion or our strategy and line of argument. (See also Section 4.4 for a summary illustration of 'forcing the issue' to this effect.)
Consider the following already explicit argument, apparently in behalf of the permissibility of abortion:13 The argument as given is virtually valid, and in this minimal sense its conclusion surely "follows." It can be readily reconstructed in its formal essentials:
A-l) For any things A and B and any action x, A does not violate any of S's rights by doing x unless B wants A not to do x. A-2) No fetus wants anyone not to fatally abort it. Therefore, no one violates a fetus' right to life by fatally aborting it.
If we wish to take issue with the argument, our task is now clearly targeted on either of the two premises. The validity of the argument spares us any vague worries about the 'logic' of the analogy between me and a fetus: we can focus on the substantive issues provoked by the premises.
The illustrative case about my property (to which the unreconstructed argument appeals) is logically gratuitous to the deductive reconstruction above. If premise (A-l) is true, then the claim about my property follows as true. (And if we do not wish to dispute the claim about my property, we can still dispute this premise on any clearly objectionable consequences that we may find in yet other cases.) But in the original argument there was more involved than the essential deductive argument framed above. There was a dialectical move, an appeal to a paradigm case, in support of the general principle (A-l).
If this principle had not been expressly stated in the original argument, we would want, for purposes of philosophic inquiry, to formulate something like it in order to provide both a general explication and a formally valid reconstruc tion of the position in question. The following analogical argument is neither valid nor explicit about the philosophic principle specially at issue: The vague intuition or tacit conviction that is purportedly common to all these cases, the intuition that (A-l) purports to capture, is that there is some connection between our desires and the violation or non-violation of our rights. Presumably we would all agree, and find good reason to agree, that whether or not someone's right is violated has something to do with what he wants others to do or to refrain from doing. Premise (A-l) formulates this connection, in ef fect, as follows: Someone's having certain desires is a necessary condition o f the violation of any of his rights.14 This may seem plausible enough in the given cases, but any discomfort about the consequences of this principle (in, say, the case of abortion) may signal that it is not a correct hypothesis regarding the presumed connection be tween rights and desires. But mere discomfort is not sufficient to remove the principle from contention or show the argument to be unsound. What is wanted is a counter-example that would in turn point the way towards a more adequate principle.
The principle in question is, however, easier to dispute than a mere analogy. We know exactly what would be formally required to refute premise (A-l) because we know formally what a counter-example would look like-namely, a case in which we could agree that: For some persons A and B and some action x, ZPs right was indeed violated by A's doing x, even though it was not the case that B wanted A not to do x -say, a case where B in fact wants A to do x but /4's doing x is nonetheless a violation of IPs right. In opting for a case of this sort I give premise (A-l) the benefit of certain doubts and by-pass the most obvious counter-examples: cases where B is asleep, drugged, in a coma or otherwise temporarily relieved of his "normal" desires that, if merely con scious, he would surely have.
In posing the following putative counter-examples I am in effect conduct ing a thought experiment by which to advance alternative hypotheses regarding the presumed connection between rights and desires. Consider: We might also try here to construct a more comprehensive principle, a more complete account of our sense that while rights are not violated in the original paradigm instance(s), rights are indeed violated in the putative counter-example cases. Perhaps we have a sense that some factors besides or other than the presence of certain desires is necessary or sufficient to the violation of a right. Can you construct a plausible and formally perspicuous principle to such ef fect? Give it a shot, using any of the following elements, suitably quantified and connected:
Revised Principle (A-l**): B's rights are/are not violated by >Ts doing jc B has a/has no right against A that A not do x B does/does not consent to /4's doing x B has an/has no 'interest* in /I's not doing x (One wants to reflect here if rights and their violation are not more ap propriately connected with our 'interests' than with desires.)
To know just how an alternative principle like (A-l*) or (A-l**) applies in the given cases we may want more facts, as well as further definition of key terms like 'consent' or 'interest'. And the mere fact that such a principle renders plausible (or neutral) but in any case c o n s is te n t judgments among the given cases does not mean that the principle is indefeasible. But it does put us onto some new notions (like interest and consent) that may play important roles in the analysis of rights and their violation.
We have come far enough in this dialectical foray to make a telling strategic observation about the original line of argument, supposing that we wish now to reject the original principle (A-l). To wit: the revised principle (A-l*) respecting the violation of rights would n o t be serviceable in the original argument; hence, this line of pro-abortion argument is now at a loss for philosophic grounding. This is apparent as much from o u t f o r m a l as from our But, even without resort to any particular counter-example, this premise seems obviously to violate our intuitions about what constitutes consent. If one is nonetheless convinced that abortion violates no rights of a fetus (or that, further, it is permissible), one apparently must-for the sake of plausibility and philosophic grounding-find grounds other than (A-l) or (B-l) for so doing. And if one wants still to appeal to certain incapacities of the fetus in support of abortion, as in premise (A-2), one evidently must-for the sake of validity-appeal to some principle other than our reformulations o f (A-l). One has, in any event, to start anew. In the meantime, we have all presumably learned some interesting things about the raw intuitions that originally motivated this line of argument-and about what it takes in general to render a plausible-sow/icfrrtg argument philosophically sound.
Reconstructing Arguments Under Deductive and Dialectical Duress
A Sample Argument for Extended Analysis: The Initial Reconstruction.
Justice surely demands that someone unjustly deprived of something to which he had a right be compensated. Of course, normally, it's wrong to discriminate among job applicants on the basis of racial or sexual characteristics. But there are exceptions (as to any general rule). Blacks and women, for example, have a right to equal opportunity for advancement in education and employment. Yet both have been unjustly discriminated against in these areas. Not only does justice require that victims of such discrimination and right-violation be compensated, but by hiring blacks and women in preference to white males we do not thereby discriminate in a morally objectionable way. We rather compensate the victims of job discrimination as justice demands.
The foregoing is an argument from alleged requirements of justice. People often appeal to considerations of compensatory justice in defense o f preferen tial hiring. One point we want to make as explicit and precise as possible by constraining the argument in valid form is exactly what justice is supposed to require, and on exactly what grounds.
Reconstructing this line of argument in deductively valid form will not pro duce some single argument or principle o f justice: many valid reconstructions are possible employing any one of several possible formulations of the alleged requirements of justice. But by constraining the argument in deductively valid form we force ourselves to specify some principle explicitly connected to the policy in question. This begins the dialectical program of successive reconstruc tions of the principle to take account of objections to it, and successive reconstructions of the argument providing the logical connection between the principle and the policy of preferential hiring. Any simple, initially plausible formulation of the argument will do for starters. Whatever fomulation we begin with, it can be made progressively more precise under the fire of counter examples and within the constraint o f deductively valid form.
Consider the following generalized reconstruction of the argument. Suitably replacing 'A"s' by 'blacks' or 'women' and ' YY by 'whites' or 'males' will render the intended conclusion of the original argument. In brackets I will assign a variable letter to each atomic sentence schema in the argument so that its underlying sentential-logical form can be readily depicted for starters. There are at least three problems with the argument as stated that come out in the course of reconstruction. First, whatever quarrel one might have with the accuracy of the initial reconstruction (A) (anyone may try his own), one can see that the logical form of the argument is, in any case, not manifestly valid: the conclusion does not follow. There are important unstated assumptions. Senten tial logic will suffice, for starters, to find and fill the gross logical gaps in the argument. Second, the argument is rife with ambiguity. Third, once one has sorted out some of the ambiguity, it turns out to be remarkably difficult to reconstruct the argument so that it both is valid and has all true or plausible premises, premises at least immune to obvious counter-example. From these lessons of formal reconstruction philosophic lessons are also to be learned. I will deal with them in turn.
The First Problems: Invalidity and Missing Premises
The argument as it stands is invalid. This is easily seen by inspection of its logical form, abstracted symbolically:
Therefore: P P One advantage of being able to depict the logical form of an argument in abbreviated notation is analogous to the advantage of having an x-ray device: it allows us to focus on the bare skeletal structure apparently supporting the con clusion, to detect distinctly structural flaws underneath the enveloping verbal flesh and musculature. From our initial x-ray o f argument (A) it's clear that the conclusion P is in no way explicitly connected to any of the stated premises. Nor is any explicit connection between premises (1) and (2) and premise (3) yet apparent: from (1) and (2) we can conclude J; but what connections are presumed to exist among J, premise (3), and the conclusion P? These connec tions, in some form, must be made explicit, so as to make explicit use of the stated premises of the argument and also render it valid. Here we need to con sider the content as well as the form of the argument.
Symbolic logical form and validity serve, respectively, as clues and guiding constraints in the search for tacit premises; but they are not sufficient grounds for generating sensible additional premises, or for deciding among competing premises where any number might make an argument valid. It is necessary to introduce other guiding constraints in the reconstruction of an argument. Validity remains a powerful minimal condition o f the enterprise nonetheless: insisting on manifest validity keeps us honest about what exactly is or must be assumed and exactly what follows from what. In this case it requires us to pro duce some further assumptions on which the conclusion tacitly rests. Once laid out explicitly, these assumptions are open to question; and this may force us to change the shape of the argument or even abandon it. One obvious tacit assumption is: R: Fs (white males) have received undue preferential treatment over X 's (blacks or women in hiring practice).
Without assuming at least some such condition it would make no sense to assert that it is morally permissible to compensate X 's at the expense of Fs. Moreover, without the addition o f some such condition as R to premise (3), this premise is open to obvious counter-example and, so far, is false. That is, in general, the truth o f S is not always a sufficient condition for the truth of M, for surely the following interpretation of premise (3) We have now come so far as to conclude that (J) justice demands compen sation and that (M) preferential hiring is on balance a morally permissible way to compensate. We have yet explicitly to complete the connection to the ultimate conclusion (P) to the effect that justice in turn demands preferential hiring as the mode of compensation. Any o f the following additional premises connecting the conclusion to the foregoing results would render the argument valid: 6') a) If J and.M, then P b) If J then P c) If M then P Both (b) and (c) are objectionable, on similar grounds. That (J) justice demands compensation is not sufficient grounds for asserting that (P) justice demands that compensation take a particular form, namely, preferential hiring. That (M) preferential hiring (or anything else, say, singing in the shower) is on balance morally permissible is not sufficient grounds for holding that (P) justice requires it. So, (b) and (c) are, when generalized, implausible or false. Moreover, their addition to the argument, while making it valid, would be to cast adrift other presumably relevant premises as logically superfluous.
It seems the best of the three alternatives is (6 ')(a). Choosing it has been an exercise in the reconstruction of a normative principle, an attempt to specify sufficient grounds on which justice would require and, so, justify a particular policy. The reconstruction o f principles and the reconstruction of arguments go hand-in-hand in the moral-philosophic forum, because normative principles are always among the (stated or tacit) assumptions of a moral-philosophic argu ment. Hence, the reconstruction of arguments can play a heuristic role in the explication and analysis of the normative principles underlying our reasonings.
Once the argument, with its tacit underlying principles, has been reconstructed in valid form, we are at least assured that if the premises are ac ceptable, so must be the conclusion. But are they?
Further Problems: Ambiguity and Defeasibility of Premises
For purposes of illustration, I will focus on the first premise of the argu ment only. Where ambiguities are discerned or counter-examples found, premises must be reformulated, jettisoned, or added. Premise revision involves further, alternative reconstructions of the argument to preserve its validity. This may be difficult, but to that extent instructive.
Consider: The principle of compensatory justice to which argument (A) appeals, premise (A-l), can of course be applied quite generally. So, the original line of reasoning and the policy based on this principle can be applied quite generally. How generally? To whoever can be counted among the X 's. Who might be counted among the X 's'l On grounds of premise (A-l), presumably anyone who has ever been deprived of something to which she had a right, say 'equal' employment opportunity. (He could well be a highly compe tent white bank executive from a wealthy family who has been denied 'equal' consideration for jobs many times because of his religious or political views.)
There is a serious ambiguity in premise (A-l). How are we to interpret the demand for compensation of A"s? There are at least two possibilities where X's are members of some identifiable group:
A distributive interpretation: a person is to be compensated if that person is an X (black, woman, atheist...) and that particular person has been unjustly discriminated against... A collective interpretation: a person is to be compensated if that person is an X and X's (blacks, women, Irish-Catholics, communists...) have in general been unjustly discriminated against... The collective interpretation of the demand for compensation for A^s does not require that any given X have been unjustly discriminated against, but rather that other X 's as a group have been unjustly deprived: under this inter pretation X 's as such are to be compensated.
A wealthy Jewish or Irish Catholic businessman who had never himself been deprived of anything could qualify under the collective interpretation for compensation where A"s were Irish Catholics or Jews. A wealthy white male who had himself been unjustly discriminated against because of his atheism could qualify for compensation under a distributive interpretation. Presumably the purpose of the preferential hiring policy in question is neither to compen sate wealthy people nor to compensate just anybody for any unjust deprivation she may have suffered. Under either interpretation the general demand for compensation could be applied to practically anybody; whereas the specific de mand for compensatory preferential hiring is on behalf of certain presently and unfairly disadvantaged groups, namely, certain racial minorities and women.
We need to specify the conditions o f premise (A-l) so as to justify compen satory treatment in the form of preferential hiring for all and only those whom the policy is meant to compensate. For a sense of these two possibly conflicting constraints-the justice and the purpose of the policy in question-we need ap peal to our intuitions, our tacit conceptions o f both, as yet imperfectly captured in premise (A-l) (and yet to be tested against limiting counter-examples).
We need first to specify more precisely the grounds on which justice demands compensation. We will consider five candidate criteria. These will be sufficient to delineate some of the major ambiguities of our original principle of compensatory justice. Consider, then: a) Membership in a group whose members have been widely and unjustly discriminated against and thereby deprived of something to which they had a right.
This criterion would qualify blacks and women, but would it qualify all and only those actually deserving compensatory treatment? As already sug gested, it would not. The criterion is too inclusive. Who would not qualify for compensation? Consider the cases of well-to-do Catholics, Protestants or Jews who have never been unjustly deprived o f anything but who are members of groups which have (somewhere) suffered great injustice. Does justice require that they be compensated?
It is evidently not mere membership in some identifiable class of persons many of whose members have suffered injustice at some time in the past that recommends a given member for compensation. Yet the policy we are seeking to justify on the basis of the requirements o f justice designates its beneficiaries according to racial or sexual characteristics.
Perhaps it is rather the likelihood o f having herself suffered injustice, given effective, recent and widespread prejudice and discrimination against X 's as such, that recommends any given X for compensatory treatment: b) Likelihood of having suffered unjust deprivation oneself because of membership in a group whose members have been recently and widely discriminated against.
This criterion would include blacks and women and exclude consideration o f white Catholics or Jews for compensation. But against this suggestion stands the case, however unlikely, of any well-to-do black woman who has never been deprived of anything. Does justice demand that a person who has never suf fered any injustice be compensated? What is it for which she would be compen sated? Analogously, should courts award compensatory damages to a person on the likelihood that he suffered defamation of character when in fact he has not-or because it is established that he was actually wronged and harmed in a way penalizable by law? The latter case is more problem-case than counter example. Consider then: Whatever justice demands in the way of compensation, it would seem that justice demands it only for persons who have themselves been unjustly harmed or deprived, not for persons who have not in fact been wronged but who hap pen to have certain characteristics (e.g., race) in common with others who have.
But while actually having been wronged oneself may be a necessary condi tion for claiming compensation on grounds of justice, this requirement of justice would not justify preferential hiring of blacks or women as such. Nor would a principle stipulating criterion (c) as a sufficient condition for compen satory treatment justify preferential hiring of all and only those (certain minori ty groups and women) whom the policy seems intended to benefit. Such a prin ciple would justify compensatory treatment of a person irrespective of her race, sex or socio-economic status. And a policy of preferential hiring based on such a criterion, designating beneficiaries according to their personal histories rather than race or sex, would seem to be impracticable and, in any case, different from the policy in question.
There are further ambiguities in the original principle that I will defer to the next section. One instructive difficulty with the line of argument under con sideration has already clearly emerged in our reconstructive effort: the problem of fitting (logically connecting) the desired policy (compensatory preferential hiring of certain racial minorities and women) to the requirements of justice that seemed initially to demand such a policy. The grounds on which justice might demand and distribute compensation are not obviously the grounds on which the policy in question would designate its beneficiaries.
A fairly superficial examination o f the ambiguities of our initial formula tion of what justice requires has produced a fair array of questions. Nevermind objections to other premises in the original argument for now. We find that the alleged requirements of justice are themselves clearly questionable. We can map out the issues and strategic options confronting us by refomulating the original deductive argument to take account of the ambiguities and objections raised. Because these difficulties have arisen from our attempts to generalize the original principle, premise (A-l), of the argument, it will be convenient to try to capture its generality and ambiguity more explicitly in the framework of quantificational logic, in Section 4.4. (In the course, I use this sort of example and rationale for motivating the transition to quantificational logic.)
Attempting to reconstruct the argument in expressly valid form, while tak ing account of ambiguities and counter-examples, makes the philosophic pro blem of fitting the desired policy to the demands o f justice more acute. While this reconstructive exercise may well make the argument less persuasive, the ex ercise is nonetheless instructive regarding some of the philosophic issues underlying the policy in question. This is one educational objective o f the task of reconstructing arguments in deductively valid form, and one rationale for my CAI programs in argument reconstruction, which enforce the constraint o f /alidity while allowing the students to view and easily manipulate both the logical form and the content of an argument side-by-side.
Forcing the Issue: The Straits of Scylla and Charybdis
Philosophic analysis within the constraint of manifest validity, the attempt to avoid both invalidity and counter-examples, is a bit like trying to negotiate the straits of Scylla and Chrybdis of Greek myth. We might also think of this endeavor as a kind of game, albeit a serious one. The object of this game is to construct an e v i d e n t l y s o u n d argument (one that both is manifestly valid and has evidently true premises) supporting the policy of preferential hiring in ques tion, on the basis of the requirements of compensatory justice. The first phase of the game is to construct a deductive argument whose conclusion is the posi tion on the policy in question by selecting those premises required to make manifest the v a l id ity of the argument. The second phase of the game is to test the tr u th and p l a u s i b i l i t y of the selected premises, by explicating ambiguities and adducing putative counter-examples or problem-cases. A given premise re mains evidently true or plausible only so far as it is at least immune to obvious counter-examples. Our two concerns are the logical connection between premises and conclusion, a matter of lo g ic a l f o r m , and the truth or plausibility of the premises, a function of their actual c o n te n t and the argumentative c o n te x t. As we shall see, these concerns are not unrelated in the game of argumen tative strategy that follows. It is often very difficult to satisfy both constraints at once. In this respect deductive validity, a matter of logical form, is indeed related to 'the pursuit o f truth' as well as to argumentative strategy. Where the task is apparently impossible, we have good reason to abandon an argument and seek alternative strategies.
Consider now a multiple-choice reformulation of the original argument from justice, argument (B), below. Premises may be constructed by selecting one (or more) of the lettered options (and providing suitable logical connec tives). The options (a)-(e) given under each premise are intended to take ac count of ambiguities detected in the principle of justice employed in the original argument (A). At this stage of reconstruction it is useful to have recourse to quantificational logic. The logical form of each premise is symbolized to its right so that validity can be readily assessed by inspection or derivation.
1) If a person X :
a) is a member of a group whose members have (x)(Mjic -Jjc) been widely and unjustly discriminated against and thereby deprived of something to which they had a right, b) is likely himself to have been unjustly (jt)(Lx-Jx) discriminated against and thereby deprived of something to which he had a right, c) has in fact himself been unjustly deprived of (jc)(F.x-J j c ) something to which he had a right, d) has himself suffered harm or serious disadvan-(ji)(Sa -Jjc) tage as a result of having been unjustly discriminated against, e) presently is suffering harm or serious disadvan-(jc)(P.x-Ja) tage as a result of having been unjustly discriminated against; Then justice demands that that person X be compensated. (c) , consider the arguments resulting from these sets of premises. Which of the op tional arguments is most evidently sound? As it happens, none is sound (i.e., none both is valid and has all its premises immune to obvious counter example).
Conditions (lc), (Id) and (le) seem to provide the most plausible grounds for justice to demand compensation, namely: that a person particularly has suf fered an injustice, or harm as a result of injustice, in order that the person ac tually have something to be compensated for. The difference between (lc) and (Id) or (le) concerns whether we wish to compensate persons who were in fact treated unjustly but who suffered no harm or disadvantage on that account. Is it the mere fact of injustice or rather the resultant harm that demands compen sation? If the latter, is it present or past harm?
By contrast, condition (la) seems an implausible basis for justice to de mand anything, let alone compensation. Mere membership in a group does not suffice to establish that a person suffered any injustice. If a person suffered no injustice, what is she to be compensated for? Some further condition seems necessary to establish an evidentiary connection between group membership and injustice, (lb) makes one likely condition explicit, asserting a probable con nection. The implausibility o f (la) can be shown by an appeal to the untoward consequences that would result from its general application: cases where justice demanded compensation but where there was no victim of injustice to be com pensated. The same objection could be lodged against (lb), with even hypothetical counter-examples. (Why hypothetical 'evidence' should count here is an interesting issue to pursue in class.)
In sum, whereas premises (lc), (Id) and (le) provide plausible grounds for justice to demand compensation, the corresponding factual assumptions respectively required to entail the desired conclusion are very likely false. On the other hand the factual assumptions (2a) and (2b), while true, seem to pro vide insufficient grounds for justice to demand compensation, as shown by counterexamples to (la) and (lb) above.
If we revise this premise of the argument in order to demand compensa tion, discriminately, for only those (blacks, women or X*s) who qualify on con ditions (lc), (Id) or (le), we would vitiate the validity of the original argument to the conclusion that calls for compensation for all blacks or women as such. If we also revise the final conclusion, to preserve validity, and thereby discriminately demand preferential hiring for only those who qualify on condi tions (lc), (Id), or (le), we cannot justify compensatory hiring of all blacks and women as such. We would then be arguing for a very different, and probably impracticable, policy. The difficulty is to provide a manifestly valid argument with plausible premises to the specified conclusion. This difficulty would be compounded if we were to examine other premises in the original argument. More subtle refinement or reformulation of the premises will not eliminate this basic difficulty. We have reached an apparent impasse in our game of argument reconstruction. There are some lessons of argumentative strategy to be gained at this impasse.
It is not obvious that an appeal to the requirements of compensatory justice is, after all, viable in behalf of preferential hiring of blacks, women or other minority members as such. This has been shown by making certain alter native connections between the policy and the presumed requirements of justice explicit in valid deductive form. Making the supposed logical connections be tween policies and principles explicit in this way forces us to clarify our nor mative assumptions and provides us with clear departure points for further dialectical analysis in disputes about matters of principle and policy.
We also get clearer on exactly what position we want or need to hold on the policy in question. When we reach an impasse such as we have in our appeal to compensatory justice, we would be well-advised at least to consider other lines of argument. Perhaps appeal to notions of distributive justice, or mere com patibility with the requirements of justice and an appeal to 'social utility* would suffice to support the policy in question. Perhaps the correction of certain social ills (disproportionate poverty, unfair competitive disadvantage, or unemployment among certain minorities) or the provision of certain social benefits (positive role models and career incentives) is the proper aim of the policy in question. Perhaps these ends, if achievable with negligible infractions of justice, would justify preferential hiring o f blacks or women as such. Perhaps. This, in any case, is a strategy different from the one with which we began. To get clear on exactly what would have to be true in the way o f both normative and factual assumptions in order to support preferential hiring along these lines we would do well to make those assumptions explicit within the frame of a valid deductive argument.
And the game of argument reconstruction and counter-example would resume. A game that is, after all, a serious form of philosophic inquiry within strict logical constraints.
Appendix
Sample Exercises in the Formal Explication o f Arguments and Principles
Of the following five sample exercises Problems 1-3 are taken from a problem set for the computer-assist program (called a r g u e ) that guides argument reconstruction and deductive derivation (by means of hints and a proof-checker). Problems 4 and 5 are sample examination questions, which could also be entered and worked through using the a r g u e program's proof-checker and its ability to represent the symbolized form of an argument and its English translation side-by-side. While formal reconstruction, symbolization, and derivation are central to these problems, it should be evident that they also involve tasks in philosophic and dialectical analysis. Difficulties of interpreta tion encountered in symbolization are often philosophically germane. Problems 1-3 in volve supplying missing premises, constructing general principles (specifying necessary or sufficient conditions) of legitimate social constraint, and assessing the plausibility of principles by deriving their logical implications for given cases. These problems are based on chapters two and three of Joel Feinberg's Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Problems 4 and 5 involve similar tasks and relate specifically to John Stuart Mill's On Liberty and an actual case of controversial pater nalism (which I have called 'the Williams case*). We use Mill and an assortment of such problem cases as the basis for seeking a system of plausible and consistent principles of legitimate social constraint-again, within a framework of strict formal-logical con straints. (The justifiability of the latter qua social-intellectual constraints also happens to be topical to the course.) These problems are dialectically related in ways that should be evident. Problem 1. Is preventing serious hurt to others the only legitimate ground for justifying coercion or prohibition by law? Is hurt the only form of harm?
Advertising the pleasures and techniques of sodomy on a large billboard in Times Square is surely offensive even if it's not hurtful to anyone. But if preventing serious hurt to others is the only legitimate ground for justifying prohibition by law, then what is offensive but not seriously hurtful may not be prohibited.
Symbolize the stated and any additional premises required to derive, by reductio ad absurdum, the conclusion that serious hurt to others is not the only ground for legitimate prohibition by law.
Let: a=the act of advertising sodomy in public Lx=jc may legitimately be prohibited by law Hx=jc is seriously hurtful to others Ox=x is offensive to others 2) Your principle has, together with plausible additional assumptions that you state as explicit premises, the logical consequence that certain specific and presumably bad actions or practices a and b may legitimately be prohibited (you choose the ex amples) and that certain other presumably permissible actions c and d may not be pro hibited. Use the a s s ig n command to assign your chosen cases a constant (for example: a = addictive drug abuse) for purposes of using the En g l is h command to obtain transla tions of your symbolized principle and the derivation of its consequences in your chosen cases.
Derive the consequences of your principle for your chosen cases (and be prepared to argue the plausibility of your principle against possible counter-examples in class).
Let: Lx=x may legitimately be prohibited lx=x is 'prejudicial' (Mill's term) to important interests of others Oa=a is offensive to others Mx=x is morally objectionable by current public standards Px=x is harmful or hazardous to the agent him/herself Problem 4. A Problem Case in Point: Williams Williams would like to be released from the hospital to which he was taken a year ago after an automobile accident (explosion) left him blind, unable to use his hands or legs, and with deforming burns over 80% of his body. His burns have not healed; if he is released from the hospital and allowed to go home, infection will set in and he will die. But Williams, who has been declared sane and mentally competent by the hospital psychiatrist, wants to die. Before his accident he enjoyed skiing, motorcycle racing, hang-gliding, and scuba diving. Blind and crippled, he will no longer be able to engage in these activities. Nor will he be able to resume his career as a real-estate broker. At by not doing z or it is the case both that x with good reason believes that do ing z is in / s best interest and x either has important information that y lacks about the consequences of not doing z or has good reason to believe that, were y calmly to deliberate about being forced to do z, y would agree to have x force him to do it.
The Case of Nick and Tina. Nick, while addicted to cigarettes, is extremely considerate of others. Outside of his own home he smokes only when those around him have con sented to his doing so. But, when he smokes, he smokes very heavily. He knows that smoking is very bad for him and he would like to quit. However, though he has tried more than once to stop, he has not succeeded. Tina, a close friend of Nick's, can't understand why he continues to befoul his system and stain his fingers, teeth, and lungs with tobacco residue. She and Nick have talked about the matter many times. And, in a recent discussion she has told Nick that she intends to do whatever necessary, even lock him in his own apartment for a week, in order to simply make it impossible for him to get any cigarettes. In response, Nick firmly told Tina that he did not want her to force him to kick his habit even if she could guarantee a 'cure' thereby. He appreciated her concern, but the problem was one that he felt he had to handle on his own, even if his own efforts should end in failure.
Symbolize Principle PP. Symbolize three additional premises that are plausible to assume in the given case and will allow you to derive the conclusion that it is not morally permissible for Tina to force Nick to stop smoking.
Derive the conclusion, being sure that none of your premises are superfluous. Let: a = Nick the cigarette addict b = Benevolent Tina c = Nick's cutting out cigarette smoking Fxyz=It is morally permissible for x to force y to do z Ryz=7 will violate someone's rights by not doing z Gx^y=oc with good reason believes that doing z is in ys best interest lxyz=x has important information that y lacks about the consequences of not doing z Hxyz=x has good reason to believe that, were y clamly to deliberate about being forced to do z, he would agree to being forced (by x) to do it. 10. For what it is worth: In spite of the facts that the course is required of all our freshmen, the classes large, and most of the students shy of both computers and for malism, the course and CAI programs each get a respectable 4.2 on student evalua tions, where a 5 is the highest rating on the scale and 3.6 is average for required courses. The computer-based logic is consistently designated the most valuable aspect of the course' by most students, even over the philosophic topics and texts. With im provements in the curriculum and integration of the CAI programs, average scores on standard mastery examinations improved by one grade level in the fall of 1980 over the previous year.
11. I provide the class with simplified explanations of dialectical method, coherence theory, pragmatic notions of the justification of epistemic and logical norms, 'virtuous' circularity, plausibility, and the regulative ideal of reflective equilibrium that bear no accidental debt to these notions as discussed or exemplified in, for example: Norman 14. In formulating the general principle, the 'weaker' interpretation of '...unless-' as, in effect, 'not...only if-' seems more reasonable than the 'stronger' 'not...if and on ly if~-or 'n ot...if--because the latter would allow that my rights were violated by someone's doing something just because I wanted him not to do it. In the particular in stances given, however, it would be tempting and plausible to opt for the latter 'stronger' interpretations because of the presupposition that 1 do indeed have rights respecting my land, beer, car, and life. A more fully explicit principle (like A-l*, below) would make this presupposition of the given cases an express condition of the violation of any rights. This is an example of how a little formal perspicuity in the statement of a principle can affect its substance and force the explication of contextual presuppositions. One strategic advantage of the original valid argument is that it could dispense with presuppositions about what rights a fetus or whatever holds, and thus skirt the issue of whether a fetus has a right to life.
Cf. note 1 in my article "Logic and Liberal learning" (in this volume) on the inter pretation of 'unless'.
15. I could well be accused of begging questions about the propriety of treating moral propositions as 'true' or 'false'. I believe that they can be so treated, and give some explanation for this treatment in my course. So I would prefer to think that I am merely begging off on a discussion of this matter here, for reasons of space constraints. But this is a serious issue to be brooked in applying truth-functional logic to the
